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abstract: Pettit endorses a ‘republican’ conception of social freedom of the person as 
consisting of a state of non-domination, and takes this to refute Mill’s ‘liberal’ claim 
that non-domineering but coercive interference can compromise social freedom of 
choice . This paper argues that Pettit’s interpretation is true to the extent that Mill 
believes that the legitimate, non-arbitrary and just coercion of would-be dominators, 
for the sake of preventing them from dominating others, can render them unfree to 
choose to do so without rendering them socially unfree (qua dominated) persons in 
their own right . however, contra Pettit, Mill is correct to reject the ‘republican’ view 
for at least two reasons . Firstly, it enables him to avoid commitment to the implausi-
ble implication that would-be dominators who sincerely deny any interest in a shared 
system of basic liberties are automatically rendered unfree persons by the coercion 
necessary to uphold such a system . Secondly, it enables him to avoid begging the 
question against ‘immoralists’ like Nietzsche, whose opposition to systems of recip-
rocal non-domination is at least partly motivated by the losses of social freedom of 
choice they entail for those they deem to be worthy of dominating others .
key words: Domination, freedom, liberalism, liberty, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Philip Pettit, republicanism .
1. Introduction
Philip Pettit’s seminal works defending republicanism contain a number of 
criticisms of the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, including his conception of 
social freedom (Pettit 1996: 577; 1997: 46–47, note 7; 2012: 210; 2014: 
21–22 .) . Mill is also presented as vulnerable to Pettit’s generic critique of 
liberalism, according to which its adherents tend to: (a) approach the idea 
of social freedom via the question of the conditions of social freedom of 
choice (choice-freedom) rather than the conditions of a socially free person 
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(person-freedom); (b) think of social choice-freedom in terms of the only form 
thereof that could be available to human beings in a pre-political condition; 
(c) take this form to be constituted by the absence of coercive interference at-
tainable through social isolation; and hence (d) treat the presence of coercive 
interference in choices as necessary and sufficient for compromised social 
choice-freedom . In contrast, Pettit claims that the republican tradition treats 
this line of thought as a chain of inferential error that should be avoided 
by rejecting (a) from the outset . For Pettit, a superior– and distinctively re-
publican–conception of social choice-freedom can be attained indirectly via 
an antecedent investigation of the conditions of social person-freedom–the 
conditions in which it is appropriate to refer to a person who lives in a politi-
cal condition as socially free as opposed to some kind of subject, serf, or slave 
(Pettit 2003, 400; 2007; 2014: 71) .
It is not difficult to find individual passages in Mill’s corpus that can 
be adduced in favour of such an interpretation . For example, in a speech on 
‘Cooperation’ (1825), the young Mill suggests that:
It is delightful to man to be an independent being . The savage of the forest 
would be the happiest of men, could he reconcile the comforts of civilized life 
with the preservation of his independence . This indeed is impossible–he must 
sacrifice a part–but this sacrifice is an evil, and can only be submitted to, for 
the sake of a greater good . So conformable is this to the general sentiments of 
mankind that benevolent enthusiasts, in their plans for new modelling society, 
have hitherto erred in giving too much freedom of action; their day dreams have 
been dreams of perfect liberty . (Mill, XXVI: 321, my italics) 1
According to one possible reading of this passage, the “independence” en-
joyed by the “savage” is a function of his complete social choice-freedom, and 
that is in turn constituted by the total absence of coercive interference that 
he enjoys in the state of nature . If this were correct, Mill would take the 
“benevolent enthusiasts” to deal in “dreams”, not because they fail to see that 
restrictions on freedom of action can promote a liberty-constituting security 
that is part and parcel of the “comforts of civilized life”, but because they fail 
to see the need to accept less liberty overall in order to enjoy distinct goods 
such as security .
This would be anathema to Pettit, for whom the genuine antonym of 
social person-freedom is not coercion but domination, and for whom non-
domination requires politics qua requiring the security-inducing protections 
of the rule of law (Pettit 2003: 399–400) . When person-freedom is con-
strued in binary terms, this republican view implies that a person is either 
socially free or dominated, and that there is no status in between (Pettit 1997: 
1 All in-text references to Mill are to volume and page number of Mill (1963–1991) .
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74–77) . however, since it is also intuitive to think that person-freedom–and, 
by extension, domination–can come in degrees, Pettit also employs a scalar 
variant thereof that we can refer to as social agency-freedom .2 The latter also 
enables him to distinguish between different conceptions of (binary) person-
freedom in terms of the amount and kind of (scalar) social agency-freedom 
that they take person-freedom to require (Pettit 2007: 715) .
As Pettit conceives it, an individual’s social agency-freedom reflects more 
than the range of, and the extent to which, her choices are not subjected 
to actual coercive interference . It is also a function of how far these choices 
are (legally and non-legally) shielded from the counterfactual coercive inter-
ference that could have occurred if she or a potential interferer had chosen 
differently (Pettit 2006: 133) . This enables Pettit to use the idea of social 
agency-freedom to bridge the gap between the notions of person-freedom 
and choice-freedom, by claiming that:
(1) an agent, α, has the social freedom to choose between two options, X 
and Y, (to a degree, D) if, and only if, α has the agency-freedom–and 
hence the salient forms of actual and counterfactual protection–to 
select either (to degree D);3 and
(2) α has person-freedom if, and only if, α has the agency-freedom of a 
sufficient range and extent to count as undominated by others (Pet-
tit 2007: 717; 2014: ch . 3) .
More controversially, Pettit couples person-freedom and choice-freedom 
further by maintaining that:
(3) if interference in α’s life renders α socially unfree to choose between 
two options, X and Y, (to a degree, D) this interference also compro-
mises α’s person-freedom (Pettit 1997: 26 note 1, 56 note 3) .4
This allows him to conclude that Mill was wrong to take coercive inter-
ference to be sufficient to compromise an individual’s social choice-freedom . 
After all, it would be absurd (for a non-anarchist like Mill (XXVI: 276)) to 
maintain that a person is unfree–which is to say, either dominated or else 
2 I take the term ‘agency-freedom’ from Pettit (2003) which treats person-freedom and 
agency-freedom as equivalent . Pettit’s rationale for this equivalence is given by the Equality 
Assumption presented in Pettit (2007: 715), on which more below . It will become clear as 
we proceed that I opt to distinguish the two as my argument can only be articulated if the 
conceptual possibility of obtaining greater scalar agency-freedom than is necessary for binary 
person-freedom remains in view . 
3 Pettit (2006: 134): “choices are socially free just so far as they are exercises of such 
chooser-based freedom” (my italics) . 
4 As we will see in Section 2, Pettit can only reconcile (1–2) with (3) by denying that ‘x 
is not free to Φ’ entails ‘x is unfree to Φ’ on the grounds that there is also the possibility that 
‘x is (merely) non-free to Φ’ . 
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subordinated in some other way that is incompatible with person-freedom–
merely in virtue of being bound by an (unwanted) coercive but legitimate 
liberal democratic rule of law (Pettit 1997: 65–66) .
This paper aims to show that Pettit is correct to claim that Mill rejects 
(3) but incorrect to claim that Mill was mistaken to do so . To readers familiar 
with Pettit’s objections to Mill this may seem surprising because (i) at times 
Pettit criticizes Mill for being so blind to the phenomenon of domination 
that the criticisms could only be plausible if Mill ignored the notion of per-
son-freedom altogether, and (ii) without that notion it would not be possible 
for Mill to take a position on its relation to social choice-freedom in the first 
place . For instance, in Republicanism Pettit suggests that Bentham and Mill 
were not concerned with social agency-freedom in either “the modal sense 
[…] of wanting to increase people’s immunity against (arbitrary) interfer-
ence, even against the sort of (arbitrary) interference that the potential inter-
ferer–the person who is not blocked from interfering–is unlikely to practice”, 
or the “sense of wanting to reduce exposure to the power of another” (Pettit 
1997: 46–47, note 7) .
however, Pettit was simply mistaken on this point . For example, in a pas-
sage from On Liberty (1859) in which Mill is discussing a time at which the 
main threat of tyranny came from the monarchy, he writes approvingly that:
The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler 
should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what 
they meant by liberty . (Mill, XVIII: 217–218, my italics; also XXVI: 346)5
he then continues as follows:
It was attempted in two ways . First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immu-
nities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach 
of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, 
or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable . A second, and generally a later 
expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent 
of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, 
was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the gov-
erning power . (Mill, XVIII: 218, my italics; also XXIX: 379–380)
Moreover, Pettit now concedes the point insofar as he acknowledges that 
Mill’s treatise The Subjection of Women (1869) is concerned with the ways in 
which women can lose their social person-freedom through domination absent 
5 lest anyone read this as implying that liberty is only nullified by the exercise of despotic 
power rather than the despotic power itself, note that elsewhere Mill makes clear that both are 
to be tackled, albeit consecutively: “It is a political law of nature that those who are under any 
power of ancient origin, never begin by complaining of the power itself, but only of its oppres-
sive exercise” (XXI: 271) . See also (XVIII: 229): “The power itself is illegitimate” .
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coercive interference, and not simply with the ways in which they can lose 
their social choice-freedom through coercive interference (Pettit 2014: 22) .6
In consequence, this paper will proceed from the assumption that Mill has 
a conception of social person-freedom according to which it is compromised 
by domination, 7 and hence assume that the question of why Mill rejects (3) 
above is not predicated on a false premise . Mill’s rationale for thinking that 
coercive interference can compromise people’s social choice-freedom without 
compromising their (domination-sensitive) social person-freedom is hinted 
at in another of his speeches, only this time one made towards the end of his 
life . In ‘The Education Bill’ (1870), Mill notes the phenomenon of religious 
authoritarians who are aggrieved at the loss of their freedom to make others 
unfree to dissent from their views . he then quips:
I dare say we should be told, if it were anyone’s interest to affirm it, that we are 
no lovers of liberty because we do not permit kings to take the liberty of hang-
ing or guillotining people at their pleasure . But the liberty we stand up for is the 
equal liberty of all, and not the greatest possible liberty of one, and slavery of all 
the rest . (Mill, XXIX: 385)
While one might think that Mill only uses ‘liberty’ in the latter inegalitarian 
sense in jest, he can be shown to use the term with this sense in other contexts 
without humorous intent . 8 Thus, Mill seems to take the humour of the joke 
to lie, not in the idea of a liberty to dominate or oppress others as such, but 
rather in the hypocrisy of those who complain about its loss (see also XXVI: 
276) .9 In consequence, he deems fallacious an inference from the fact that 
someone has no right to a particular choice-freedom, and hence no right to 
complain of its loss, to the conclusion that this choice-freedom cannot be 
compromised (cf . Pettit 1997: 55–56; 2014: 115–116) . Thus, I will argue, 
the crux of the issue between Mill and Pettit is not that Mill rejects or ignores 
the idea of (domination-sensitive) person-freedom, but rather that he believes 
6 however, in the same passage Pettit continues to maintain that Mill was blind to the 
ways in which poverty could result in the domination of the poor by the rich . Cf . Urbinati 
2002: 192–199 . 
7 For recent Mill scholarship which appears to either defend or share the ‘assumption’–
which is distinct from the claim that Mill agrees with Pettit’s equation of person-freedom and 
non-domination–see Baum (2000), Demetriou (2013), Donner (2008), Giovanni (2013), 
Morales (2007), and Urbinati (2002, 2007) . A notable exception is lovett (2008), which I 
hope to be able to discuss elsewhere along with Pettit’s early rationale for rejecting the assump-
tion (including the probability argument in Pettit (1997: 46–47, note 7)) .
8 For example, in a letter discussing his opposition to American slavery Mill does not 
contrast it with liberty as such but rather “that liberty against which the system of Slavery is the 
deepest outrage” (XXXII: 191, my italics) . 
9 In consequence, lest it need to be said, Mill is not sympathizing with those who lose 
this inegalitarian form of liberty (Miller 2005: 258) .
32 Prolegomena 18 (1) 2019
that the choice- and agency-freedom of dominators has to be compromised 
in order to render them unfree to dominate others .
In what follows Section 2 sets out the technicalities of Pettit’s account 
of social freedom that enable him to make his case against Mill . Section 3 
defends the interpretive claim that Mill acknowledges that there is a form 
of social choice-freedom that is born of the domination of others . Section 4 
defends the philosophical claims that it was reasonable for him to maintain 
that the coercion of would-be dominators compromises this choice-freedom 
without compromising their person-freedom, and that this enables him to 
avoid the charge of begging the question against proponents of the freedoms 
flowing from domination . Finally, Section 5 examines some further prob-
lems that afflict Pettit’s position, but which Mill can avoid, in virtue of their 
disagreement .
2. Pettit on Choice-Freedom and Agency-Freedom
Pettit’s conception of choice-freedom is opportunity-based in the sense of im-
plying that an agent, α, is free to choose to perform an action (or select an 
option), Φ, to the extent that α has the opportunity to Φ . This contrasts with 
an exercise-based conception of choice-freedom in which α can only be said to 
be free to Φ to the extent that α has actually exercised an existing capacity to 
Φ (Pettit 1997: 27–31) . Pettit’s conception of the strongest form of choice-
freedom, which he labels “outright” choice-freedom, is also capacity-based 
in the sense of implying that α has the opportunity to Φ to the extent that α 
has the capacity to Φ (Pettit 2007: 715–716) . While this means that outright 
choice-freedom can be compromised by any form of incapacitation, Pettit 
denies that choice-freedom is only compromised by obstacles that “block” an 
option in virtue of rendering it impossible for an agent to select it . Instead he 
understands incapacitation more broadly, so as to include obstacles that also 
merely “burden” an option, by making it more difficult or costly for an agent 
to pursue it (Pettit 2003: 391) .
Pettit’s conception of outright choice-freedom can be divided into the 
subcategories of social and non-social choice-freedom in such a way as to 
imply that an agent has the former if, and only if, the agent has both of the 
latter . likewise, he divides non-social choice-freedom into three further sub-
categories, namely, physical, psychological, and natural, such that an individual 
has the former if, and only if, she has each of the latter (Pettit 2006: 132–136; 
2007: 711) . This conception of non-social choice-freedom is ‘negative’ in the 
sense that the presence of physical, psychological, and natural choice-freedom 
depends upon the absence of physical, psychological, and natural obstacles 
respectively . Pettit seems to conceive of physical and psychological obstacles 
as ‘internal’ to the agent (e .g ., a disability that prevents someone from walk-
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ing or remembering), and natural obstacles as ‘external’ to the agent (e .g ., 
a mountain that an agent must circumnavigate in order to reach a destina-
tion) .
As Pettit conceives it, social choice-freedom is like natural choice-free-
dom insofar as it is compromised by sources of incapacitation external to the 
agent, but unlike it insofar as it is only compromised by socially-generated 
obstacles for which people can be held accountable on grounds of intention 
or negligence (Pettit 1997: 26; 2003: 314) . Moreover, although Pettit doesn’t 
say so, it seems that social obstacles will at least tend to operate through 
physical and psychological incapacitation . For example, while an agent might 
be merely physically (or naturally)10 blocked from leaving a room with a 
locked door, eo ipso she might also be said to be socially blocked from doing 
so if the door was deliberately or negligently locked by someone else (Miller 
1983: 71) . likewise, while an agent’s option of leaving her home might be 
psychologically burdened by her fear of doing so, eo ipso it might also be said 
to be socially burdened if that fear was induced by another agent’s threats . 
Since physical and psychological incapacitation can stem from purely non-
social sources, Pettit takes it to be possible for an agent’s outright choice-
freedom to Φ to be compromised without the agent’s social choice-freedom 
being compromised . In such circumstances, Pettit says that the agent’s social 
choice-freedom to Φ is “conditioned”, or that the agent is socially non-free 
(as opposed to free or unfree) to Φ . In doing so, he indicates that the absence 
of social blocks and burdens does not imply a capacity to exercise the cor-
responding social choice-freedom (Pettit 2006: 132) .
According to Pettit, one reason why it is important to distinguish be-
tween social and non-social choice-freedom is that it is feasible (and desir-
able) to shield people against social obstacles to a degree that they cannot be 
shielded against physical, psychological, and natural obstacles (Pettit 2005: 
88–90; 2006: 133; 2014: 115–120) . Pettit’s point seems to be that, whereas 
all living agents’ subjection to gradual physical and psychological incapaci-
tation is inevitable, and their subjection to natural laws is the unavoidable 
precondition of their natural existence, their subjection to various forms of 
socially-mediated physical and psychological incapacitation is not (Pettit 1997: 
26) . From this Pettit infers that in the case of social freedom it becomes feasi-
ble to conceive of agents’ choices as free, not merely because they happen not 
to be subject to social obstacles in a given instance, but because their physical 
and psychological capacities are shielded from, and thereby modally immu-
nized against, the salient forms of socially-generated incapacitation across a 
range of possible worlds (Pettit 2006: 134) . In consequence, while Pettit’s 
10 Depending upon how exactly the line is drawn between the two . 
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conception of social choice-freedom continues to be opportunity-based, it 
implies that simply exercising an opportunity to Φ is insufficient to be free to 
Φ . The rationale for this is that, to be free to Φ, α’s opportunity to Φ needs 
to be shielded across a sufficiently broad range of possible worlds for this op-
portunity not to have been contingent on the fact that no one who had the 
capacity to create a social obstacle opted to do so in that instance .
Pettit refers to the form of social freedom in which an agent’s capacities 
are protected from social obstacles by this kind of modally robust shield as 
agency-freedom (Pettit 2003) .11 This is supposed to reflect the fact that it is 
the agent’s capacity to choose that is shielded, and this shield is not contin-
gent on the agent exercising his capacity to choose with the consent, or to the 
satisfaction, of another . As thus conceived, (social) agency-freedom12 comes 
in degrees, and there is no guarantee that one person will have the same de-
gree of shielding as another . In particular, it will be possible for peoples’ de-
gree of agency-freedom to vary in both breadth and depth, corresponding to 
the range of choices that are shielded from social obstacles, on the one hand, 
and the strength of the shields protecting the choices within this range, on the 
other (Pettit 2006: 134) .
Pettit also claims that inequalities of agency-freedom can generate rela-
tions of domination . While we will see that Pettit offers a complex elabora-
tion of what it means to dominate and be dominated, the basic idea is that 
one agent, α, dominates another agent, β, if, and only if, α has the power to 
interfere with β’s choices at “his own pleasure” on an “arbitrary basis” (Pettit 
1997: 55) . The link between domination and inequalities of agency-freedom 
stems from the claim that if α is shielded from interference in his choices 
stemming from β (to a degree, D) but not vice versa, α’s shield gives him the 
power, and hence the freedom, to interfere in β’s choices with impunity (of 
degree D) . Since such inequalities of power can come in degrees, the same 
is true of domination, and a relation of reciprocal non-domination between 
two agents will require them to have equal degrees of agency-freedom (Pettit 
2003: 397) .
While agency-freedom and domination are scalar notions when thus 
construed, Pettit also opts to use them to cash out the binary notion of a (so-
cially) (un)free person, such as that employed in the contrast between masters 
and slaves on the one hand, and citizens and subjects, on the other (Pettit 
1997: 31–35) . In consequence, he deems it necessary to posit criteria that can 
be employed to determine whether the degree of a given person’s agency-free-
11 Another terminological variant is ‘chooser-freedom’ . See Pettit (2006: 134) .
12 From here on, in order to minimize terminological clutter I will drop the ‘social’ and 
‘non-social’ qualifiers; unless otherwise stated, the reader should assume that the freedom un-
der discussion is of the social variety . 
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dom, corresponding to its particular breadth and depth, passes the thresh-
old for considering the person to be free . Pettit notes that this task can be 
undertaken under one of two possible but mutually incompatible assump-
tions . According to the first assumption, which he refers to as the “[E]quality 
[A]ssumption”, to be a free person–perhaps a citizen as opposed to some kind 
of subject–requires as much but no more agency-freedom than the maximum 
that is compatible with equal agency-freedom for all members of society (call 
this egalitarian agency-freedom) (Pettit 2007: 215) . Since egalitarian agency-
freedom is also the threshold for non-domination, this approach implies that 
to be a free person it is necessary and sufficient that one is not dominated . 
From here the notion of a free society can be cashed out in terms of a society 
in which each member is a citizen, and the citizens exist in a relationship of 
reciprocal non-domination .
Pettit opts for the Equality Assumption because he wants his conception 
of person-freedom to be a universalizable, egalitarian and morally defensible 
ideal . This creates a stark contrast with the second possible assumption that 
can be adopted when mapping the scalar notions of social agency-freedom 
and domination onto the binary notion of an (un)free person . According to 
this ‘Inequality Assumption’, to be a free person requires a greater degree of 
agency-freedom than egalitarian agency-freedom, and hence more than that 
afforded to citizens in a free society (call this inegalitarian agency-freedom) .13 
Since the possession of inegalitarian agency-freedom would give one greater 
shields than, and hence power over, others, it implies that people can only 
be free if they are dominators . In consequence, it makes sense to refer to this 
conception of person-freedom as freedom-as-domination . According to one 
logically possible (but rather strong) conception of freedom-as-domination, 
to be a free person would require the level of inegalitarian agency-freedom 
associated with the status of a ‘master’, and hence to be considered a free per-
son an individual would require (unfree persons as her) ‘slaves’ . While weaker 
conceptions of freedom-as-domination are possible, each carries the implica-
tion that either no societies are free, or that not all societies can be, because 
the egalitarian agency-freedom that the citizens enjoy in the free societies is 
predicated upon their domination of members of other societies . In either 
case, the implication is that the largest collective form of freedom that is at-
tainable is that of a free class of people who constitute a proper subset of the 
human population, and dominate at least a part of their complement .14
13 Pettit highlights this option but does not explore it as I do here . 
14 In consequence, it is really necessary to distinguish between universalizable and non-
universalizable conceptions of egalitarian agency-freedom . To minimize terminological clutter, 
in what follows the reader should assume that references to egalitarian agency-freedom are 
references to its fully egalitarian, universalizable variety . 
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While Pettit’s claim that ‘free person’ and ‘non-dominated person’ 
should be treated as extensionally equivalent is open to contestation,15 it is far 
from obvious that it needs to contradict a liberal account of choice-freedom 
(Kristjánsson 1998a: 265–70) . however, Pettit sees a tension between them 
because in giving analytical and explanatory priority to person-freedom over 
choice-freedom, on the one hand, and construing person-freedom in terms 
of the Equality Assumption, on the other, he is committed to maintaining 
that an individual’s person-freedom and his choice-freedom are compromised 
if, and only if, his egalitarian agency-freedom is compromised (Pettit 1998: 
275–279) . In also holding that an individual’s egalitarian agency-freedom is 
compromised if, and only if, he is dominated, Pettit is able to derive two key 
‘republican’ implications that he takes liberals such as Mill to find unaccept-
able:
Domination Necessary for Compromised Choice-Freedom (DN): If β’s 
choice-freedom is compromised by α, α dominates β .
Domination Sufficient for Compromised Choice-Freedom (DS): If α 
dominates β, β’s choice-freedom is compromised by α .
The scope of this paper is restricted to examining whether and why Mill 
rejects DN, and whether Pettit is right to criticize him for doing so . In conse-
quence, an examination of the accuracy of Pettit’s claim that Mill rejects DS 
must be left for another study .
3. Mill and DN I: Against the Reduction of Agency-Freedom 
to Egalitarian Agency Freedom
Pettit claims that Mill rejects DN qua taking interference in the form of force 
or explicit threats to be sufficient for choice-freedom to be compromised, 
even though these are insufficient for domination (Pettit 1996: 577; 1997: 
46–47, note 7; 2014: 21–22) . The accuracy of this attribution can be con-
firmed with reference to Mill’s famous harm Principle from On Liberty:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection 
[…] . [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others . 
(Mill, XVIII: 223, my italics)
here Mill defines interference (in choice-freedom) in terms of “compulsion 
and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal 
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion” (ibid .) . This suggests that 
15 Markell (2008) and Sparling (2013) argue that non-domination is insufficient for 
(social) person-freedom . 
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Mill rejects DN on the grounds that if such “legal penalties” and “coercion” 
are used to block or burden the option of an agent “against his will” but 
without violating the harm Principle, this is sufficient to compromise his 
freedom to choose that option even though it is insufficient to render him 
an unfree person .
While Pettit deems Mill to err here, this charge cannot be vindicated 
with reference to the idea of agency-freedom alone . That is, Mill can accept 
that (i) egalitarian agency-freedom is sufficient for person-freedom (Equality 
Assumption); and (ii) various forms of compulsion and control are consist-
ent with (qua required for universalizing) egalitarian agency-freedom; while 
denying that (iii) such compulsion and control compromises individuals’ 
person-freedom simply in virtue of being imposed against their will; because 
he endorses the following:
Choice Compromising Principle (CCP): If a social obstacle imposed by α blocks 
or burdens β’s option, α’s obstacle compromises β’s (social) choice-freedom, and 
hence her agency-freedom .
After all, the fact that β must be subjected to various forms of compulsion 
and control in order to have the same (i .e ., equal) agency-freedom as others is 
compatible with those laws compromising β’s agency-freedom qua eliminat-
ing the shields that would give her more (i .e ., inegalitarian) agency-freedom 
than others . Moreover, this position is plausible insofar as it is intuitive to 
deny that a person is unfree in virtue of being blocked or burdened from 
dominating others, but counter-intuitive to deny that such blocks and bur-
dens make her unfree to choose to establish the conditions in which she can 
do so .16
Since Pettit cashes out the idea of domination in terms of one agent’s 
subjection to the modally immunized will of another, he cannot reject CCP 
by denying that inegalitarian agency-freedom is a genuine form of agency-
freedom . In consequence, in order to defend DN, he is forced to claim that 
social obstacles can limit (or ‘condition’) agency-freedom without compro-
mising it instead (Section 4) . however, before exploring the rationale for 
Pettit’s position, I want to explore a possible rationale for an alternative in-
terpretation of Mill’s position . According to this counter-interpretation, Mill 
actually accepts DN, and hence rejects CCP, by denying that there exists any 
genuine agency-freedom above the egalitarian quota, and hence maintains 
that there is nothing above that quota to be compromised in the first place . If 
this counter-interpretation were correct, while Mill’s position would still dif-
16 For example, if some members of a group of colonialists dominate a country, they are 
not dominated by the colonial government in virtue of being rendered unfree to do whatever 
they like to the native population (Mill, XIX: 571; Urbinati 2007: 78) .
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fer from that of Pettit, it would be much closer to it than it is according to my 
own interpretation, as it would leave the door open to Mill’s membership in 
the republican ‘family’ as it is conceived by Pettit (Morales 2007: 60–61) .17
The possibility of such an interpretation is hinted at, although perhaps 
not (fully) endorsed, by Nadia Urbinati . Urbinati acknowledges that the 
young Mill posits a form of social freedom that can be enhanced by the 
domination of others, on the basis of the following passage from 1824:
liberty, in its original sense, means freedom from restraint . In this sense, every 
law, and every rule of morals, is contrary to liberty . A despot, who is entirely 
emancipated from both, is the only person whose freedom of action is com-
plete . A measure of government, therefore, is not necessarily bad, because it is 
contrary to liberty; and to blame it for that reason, leads to confusion of ideas . 
(Mill, I: 296 my italics; also XXVI: 282)
Nevertheless, she maintains that, “in his later political essays”, he adopted an 
alternative view, “more in line with the classical notion of liberty”, accord-
ing to which “[i] the despot does not enjoy more freedom than his subjects, 
and [ii] […] the foundation of freedom is a condition of moral and political 
equality” (Urbinati 2002: 159; also Donner 2008: 147) .
In order to assess this claim, it is necessary to consider which kind of 
‘freedom’ Urbinati has in mind . If she means a universalized person-freedom, 
(ii) would be true but (i) would be false qua implying that Mill believes 
despots lack person-freedom in the same way as slaves . After all, in The Sub-
jection of Women (1869), Mill argues that Roman civilization did more than 
any other hitherto to illustrate the possibility and attraction of a system of 
law-generated, civic republican liberty, even though “the best of these” “free 
republics of antiquity” only granted civic equality to “free male citizens”, and 
thereby left “slaves, women, and the unenfranchised residents” subjected to 
the citizens’ “law of force” (XXI: 294, my italics) . In consequence, that late 
work leaves the distinction between free masters and unfree slaves very much 
intact .
Alternatively, if the ‘freedom’ Urbinati has in mind is not purely social 
but also incorporates Mill’s conception of autonomy or “rational freedom” 
(Mill XXI: 336; also VIII: 841; XVIII: 262–264), her claim could be closer 
to the truth . On the one hand, Mill certainly believes that α’s domination 
by β will tend to undermine β’s psychological freedom (Mill XXI: 413; also 
Morales 2007: 49) .18 And on the other, he also makes clear that possession of 
17 Of course, to be a full member he would have to accept DS as well (Section 2) . 
18 Recall that (1) if a social obstacle compromises psychological choice-freedom, this will 
also count as compromised social choice-freedom, but (2) for the purposes of this paper, I am 
remaining agnostic vis-à-vis Mill’s commitment to DS, and hence agnostic as to whether he 
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arbitrary power tends to render people so unreasonable (XXI: 155–156) that it 
would seem to follow that dominators will tend to lack such rational freedom 
as well (VIII: 841) .19 In consequence, Mill’s position seems to be consistent 
with an unreasonable master being equally deprived of rational freedom as a 
mentally subjugated slave .20 Nevertheless, this would not suffice to support Ur-
binati’s claim, as the fact that a despot lacks greater psychological freedom than 
his subjects would not show that she does not have greater social freedom .
In consequence, for Urbinati’s claim to stand, she would have to be re-
ferring to agency-freedom .21 Moreover, as thus understood, her claim would 
support the counter-interpretation under consideration . After all, if Mill does 
not believe that the despot has more agency-freedom than his subordinates, it 
will follow that whatever it is that he loses when the options that are opened 
up by his domination of others are closed through the coercion that estab-
lishes a free society, it is not agency-freedom, and hence his agency-freedom 
will not be compromised by such coercion .
To my knowledge, the best evidence that can be adduced to support this 
counter-interpretation comes from a passage in Centralisation (1862) .22 hav-
ing noted a claim made by M . Duponte-White, that “if liberty is a principle 
of moral elevation, it is because it means power” (quoted in Mill XIX: 610, 
my italics), Mill declares that:
We look upon this confounding of the love of liberty with the love of power, the 
desire not to be improperly controlled with the ambition of exercising control, 
believes that α’s domination of β will always result in the compromise of β’s physical or psy-
chological choice-freedom . It should also be noted that once Mill starts referring to ‘rational 
freedom’ he could be interpreted as slipping into employing an exercise-based conception of 
psychological freedom (see Section 2 above) . 
19 But only ‘tend’ because Mill posits conditions in which despotism is reasonable, 
namely, when the despot refrains from abusing her power, and uses it effectively to generate 
the social progress that has a self-sustaining free society as its telos (XVIII: 224) .
20 Or possibly even more deprived (XXI: 321) .
21 Although the conception Urbinati (2002: 163) settles on seems to combine aspects of 
social and psychological freedom . 
22 Some might appeal to (XXI: 338) instead, in which Mill claims that: “The love of 
power and the love of liberty are in eternal antagonism” . however, in this passage Mill is not 
denying that an increase in α’s power over β translates into an increase in α’s agency-freedom 
qua providing α with the capacity to block or burden β’s possible actions that could otherwise 
block or burden α’s possible actions (including α’s acts of coercive interference in β’s life) . Mill 
is discussing cases in which α dominates agents β and γ, and (lamentably) the latter pair are 
more inclined to seek to dominate each other than to seek a condition in which each of them 
“individually is able to do without it” . Mill proceeds to claim that this condition “can only 
be where respect for liberty in the personal concerns of each” – or what I have referred to as 
person-freedom grounded on equal political power – “is an established principle .” Thus, the 
liberty that is at odds with power is that of equally distributed agency-freedom, not agency-
freedom as such . 
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to be both a psychological error, and the worst possible moral lesson […] . The 
love of liberty, in the only proper sense of that word, is unselfish; it places no 
one in a position of hostility to the good of his fellow-creatures; all alike may 
be free, and the freedom of one has no solid security but in the equal freedom of the 
rest . The appetite for power is, on the contrary, essentially selfish; for all cannot 
have power; the power of one is power over others, who not only do not share 
in his elevation, but whose depression is the foundation on which it is raised . 
(Mill XIX: 610, my italics; also XXI: 321, 338)
here the ‘freedom’ of “all alike may be free” is binary rather than scalar, and 
thus corresponds to person-freedom . In consequence, it is no mystery why 
Mill deems it a terrible “moral lesson” to imply that such ‘freedom’ (or “lib-
erty in the only proper [i .e ., moral] sense of the word”) means power over 
others, as such a lesson presupposes a conception of person-freedom that is 
predicated on the Inequality rather than the Equality Assumption .23
Nevertheless, the possibility of using the passage to support the counter-
interpretation is opened up by the fact that Mill’s use of “equal freedom to 
the rest” reflects a shift to a scalar conception, on the one hand, and his refer-
ence to “security” implies that he has agency-freedom in mind (II: 12; XXI: 
5, 351–352; also Donner 1991: 173–177; Goodin 2003: 60; cf . Pettit 1997: 
46–47, note 7), on the other . If Mill thinks that the “security” or agency-
freedom of one person requires “equal freedom of the rest”, we might take 
him to be committed to the view that it is not possible to shield one person 
at all unless all are equally shielded . From this it would follow that the only 
shielded status (or agency-freedom) that can be realized is that of reciprocal 
non-domination or egalitarian agency-freedom . This would also imply that, 
while there can be no analytic reduction of ‘agency-freedom’ as such to the 
egalitarian form thereof, the only empirical instances of the former turn out 
to be instances of the latter as a matter of contingent synthetic fact . From this 
it would follow, in turn, that it is an empirical truth that there can be no dis-
tinctively domineering form of agency-freedom, and hence no realizable con-
ception of person-freedom corresponding to freedom-as-domination . Since 
it is also an analytic truth that the egalitarian agency-freedom of one person 
is consistent with the egalitarian agency-freedom of another, this synthetic 
‘reduction’ of agency-freedom to its egalitarian form would then ensure that, 
as a matter of fact, the egalitarian agency-freedom of one person cannot com-
promise the agency-freedom as such of another .
Of course, any proponent of this counter-view would have to acknowl-
edge that it is at least far from obvious that the preceding accounts for Mill’s 
meaning, especially since he appears to acknowledge the existence of a domi-
23 however, the reference to a “psychological error” suggests that Mill may also be point-
ing to the negative impact that despotic power may have on people’s ‘rational freedom’ . 
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neering form of agency-freedom in other parts of Centralisation itself . For ex-
ample, while discussing the abuse of power by low-level government officials, 
and its effects on the psychological freedom of those who must engage with 
them, he asks:
how should they [i .e ., the subordinated] not be slavish, when anyone wearing 
a Government uniform, so long as he takes care to be servile to all persons of 
station who are on good terms with the Government, can domineer at will over 
all the rest,–well knowing that instead of laying a complaint before the near-
est magistrate, they have no refuge but an appeal to his own, perhaps distant, 
employer? What protection are a free press and Parliamentary government to 
them? (Mill, XIX: 587, my italics; also XXVI: 346)
here the general population’s lack of recourse is said to provide the govern-
ment officials with a form of impunity, thus generating the kind of shielded 
status for their actions that Pettit associates with agency-freedom . In con-
sequence, since this is agency-freedom of the unequal domineering variety 
– albeit one which is consistent with a hierarchical ladder of rank in which 
α’s domination of β is consistent with α’s domination by γ – the late Mill can-
not (consistently) believe that agency-freedom always reduces to egalitarian 
agency-freedom in practice .
Charity would thus suggest that if there are occasions in which the late 
Mill reserves the term ‘liberty’ to reference the morally legitimate form of 
person-freedom predicated on the Equality Assumption, this tells us more 
about his rhetorical savviness than his conception of the limits of agency-
freedom as such . however, appeals to charity are unnecessary as it is actually 
more plausible to take the term “solidity” in the passage above (XIX: 610) to 
imply, not that there is no empirical exemplification of the domineering form 
of agency-freedom, but rather that such status is unlikely to be viable in the 
long term because of the way in which those who have been subordinated 
historically are increasingly prone to rebel against their perceived oppressors . 
This is supported by a passage from Mill’s “De Tocqueville on Democracy in 
America II” (1840) in which he echoes his early pronouncements about the 
compromises that civilization requires, by claiming that:
The majority, like other despotic powers, will be taught by experience that it 
cannot enjoy both the advantages of civilized society, and the barbarian liberty 
of taking men’s lives and property at its discretion . let it once be generally 
understood that minorities will fight, and majorities will be shy of provok-
ing them . The bad government of which there is any permanent danger under 
modern civilization, is in the form of bad laws and bad tribunals: government 
by the sic volo either of a king or a mob belongs to past ages, and can no longer 
exist out of the pale of Asiatic barbarism . (Mill, XVIII: 178, my italics for “bar-
barian liberty”; also X: 231; XVIII: 157; XXVI: 270, 345–346)
42 Prolegomena 18 (1) 2019
If (XIX: 610) is understood in this light, it will not support the claim that 
the mid-to-late Mill rejects CCP . After all, the claim that the inegalitarian 
agency-freedom of dominators will not be viable in the long term is consist-
ent with the claim that it is compromised by the emerging social forces that 
make this the case .
4. Pettit and CCP: Compromising or Conditioning?
Sections 2–3 have argued that Mill and Pettit share a commitment to positing 
the existence of domineering forms of agency-freedoms, thus eliminating the 
interpretive possibility that Mill rejects CCP and endorses DN qua denying 
the existence thereof . however, since this still leaves open the possibility that 
Mill was wrong to endorse CCP and reject DN on the grounds offered by Pet-
tit, it is now time to evaluate Pettit’s rationale for his anti-liberal position .
This evaluation can be made with reference to Mill’s example of the 
“barbarian liberty” cited immediately above – the liberty, possessed by “des-
potic powers”, of “taking men’s lives and property at its discretion” (XVIII: 
178) . If my interpretation of Mill is correct, CCP commits him to the view 
that if a countervailing social power blocks or burdens this agency-freedom, 
it thereby compromises it . In contrast, Pettit denies that the agency-freedom 
of dominators is compromised by coercion that is necessary to reduce their 
agency-freedom to the egalitarian level . his reason for doing so is that such 
coercion has a purely ‘conditioning’ effect qua failing to compromise their 
person-freedom . In other words, Pettit will concede that a despot can be 
rendered not free to seize property at his discretion, while maintaining that 
his choice-freedom is not thereby compromised because he is merely non-free 
to perform the domineering action rather than unfree to do so (Pettit 1997: 
26, note 1; 56, note 3) .
The problem for Pettit is to explain why the fact that someone has enough 
agency-freedom to count as a free-person implies that any agency-freedom 
over and above that ‘amount’ cannot be compromised . In the example at 
hand the despotic power is described as losing its “barbarian liberty” due to 
the growing power, capacity, and willingness to fight of hitherto persecuted 
minorities . The latter power, defending egalitarian agency-freedom, is just as 
much a social power–which its possessors exercise in intentional, responsibil-
ity-inducing ways–as its counterpart in the class conflict . In consequence, 
Pettit cannot support his conclusion by claiming that, whereas the barbarian 
power compromises, the egalitarian power conditions the choice-freedom of 
its counterpart, as this would imply the falsehood that the egalitarian power 
constitutes a non-social obstacle to the despot’s social freedom .
Nor will it help Pettit’s cause to maintain that the unviability of the des-
potic power means that its agency-freedom is not compromised in this case . 
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After all, if an egalitarian force does not compromise the unviable agency-
freedom of a despot even though it is the egalitarian force that renders it unvi-
able, the same will be true in cases where despots are successful at preventing 
or undermining the viability of free societies . A master would then be able 
to claim, with the same degree of validity, that his slave’s agency-freedom is 
only ‘conditioned’ by the chains he has imposed on him because the slave’s 
prospects of breaking them are so poor .
Of course, to argue thus is not to commit to a moral equivalence be-
tween compromising egalitarian and inegalitarian agency-freedom . After 
all, it is consistent with Mill’s denial that it is always wrong to compromise 
agency-freedom as such (Kristjánsson 1998b: 294) . however, it does have the 
advantage over the position offered by Pettit of avoiding the charge of beg-
ging the question against those who favour freedom-as-domination . Consider 
Nietzsche, who occasionally equates the “will to power” with “the instinct for 
freedom”, “the same active force as the one that is at work on a grand scale 
in those artists of violence and organizers, and that builds states” (Nietzsche 
1994: II §18) .24 Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’ leads him to lament the loss of an 
aristocratic liberty that had the enslavement of the masses as its precondition 
(Nietzsche 2002: §257–259; see also: Detwiler 1990; Dombowsky 2004; cf . 
Clark 1999), and to take the intuition that good things (such as agency-free-
dom) cannot emerge from their opposite (i .e ., slavery), as little more than 
a sentimental, metaphysical “prejudice” (Nietzsche 2002: §2) .25 Mill’s use 
of phrases like “barbarian liberty” seem to reflect his acknowledgement that, 
even if there are good moral reasons to oppose social systems that generate 
inegalitarian distributions of agency-freedom, one cannot succeed in demon-
strating this by simply building an egalitarian distribution of agency-freedom 
into the definition of ‘agency-freedom’ as such .26 To do so is simply to ger-
rymander the language of ‘freedom’ so as to make it impossible to articulate 
the inegalitarian alternative (I: 296–297) .
The implication for the evaluation of Pettit’s position is that it is im-
portant to be very careful with the Equality Assumption . On the one hand, 
24 Compare the young Mill’s description of the origins of feudalism: “Imagine a tribe 
[…] spreading itself by conquest […] reducing the native population to the state of domestic 
cattle! Each chief absolute master of thousands […] acknowledging no regular government, 
but striving to retain his pristine independency! Not only is no one secure from the arbitrary 
will of a master; even that master cannot afford him protection against other despots and 
slaves!” (XXVI: 259) . In this passage the non-interference enjoyed by these “masters” rises to 
the level of inegalitarian agency-freedom . 
25 This is not to say that he believes that his aristocratic elite should somehow recreate the 
past but rather that they should contemplate “a new slavery” (Nietzsche 2001: §377) .
26 Indeed, Pettit (1997: 18–19) criticizes conceptions of the difference between positive 
and negative liberty which preclude the possibility of the latter taking on a republican form .
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it may be legitimate to use the binary notions of egalitarian-inegalitar-
ian agency-freedom to theorize the binary notions of a free-unfree person . 
But on the other, it remains a mistake to ignore the scalar nature of social 
agency-freedom as such, and reduce it to either egalitarian agency- or person-
freedom . Doing so doesn’t simply occlude the insight that domination (of 
others), conceived as inegalitarian agency-freedom, is a form of freedom that 
should be compromised; it also begs the question against those who have taken 
the unfreedom of an (alleged) aristocracy to choose to create the conditions 
in which they can dominate others, to be a greater evil than the unfreedom of 
the masses to choose the preconditions of their emancipation therefrom .
5. Mill and DN II: The Nature of Arbitrary Interference and the 
Significance of Democratic Control
In order to highlight some additional problems that Mill can, and Pettit can-
not, avoid in virtue of their disagreement over DN/CCP, it will be useful 
to dig deeper into Pettit’s account of what makes interference arbitrary and 
non-arbitrary in the first place . In Republicanism Pettit’s preliminary account 
maintains that interference is arbitrary if it is:
[1] chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of 
those affected . [2] The choice is not forced to track what the interests of those 
others require according to their own judgments . (Pettit 1997: 55, my italics)27
For his part, Mill claims that: “Everybody has two kinds of interests, in-
terests which he cares for, and interests which he does not care for .” (XIX: 
444) Moreover, On Liberty makes clear that the harm Principle is designed 
to block or burden any interference that is illegitimate or arbitrary qua fail-
ing to track “the permanent” de re “interests of man as a progressive being” 
(XVIII: 224) . In consequence, Mill can accept (1) insofar as it refers to de re 
interests in non-intervention in non-harmless actions that all share, including 
aggressors, whether they realize this or not . This means that he can also agree 
that an aggressor’s legitimate sphere of shielded choice-freedom (or egalitarian 
agency-freedom) is not compromised by coercive interference designed to 
prevent her from violating the egalitarian agency-freedom of others (Urbinati 
2002: 168) . however, Mill cannot accept condition (2), as he denies that 
defensive coercive interference is arbitrary merely in virtue of failing to track 
the illegitimate de dicto interests of aggressors in inflicting harm on others .28
27 Pettit (2012: 58) also makes clear that predicating “arbitrariness” of interference should 
not be taken to entail either that it is wrong or not rule-governed . 
28 For Mill, people are especially prone to cultivate such despotic interests when they are 
corrupted by power (XIX: 445) . 
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The obviousness of the preceding objection29 to Pettit’s initial account 
may help to explain why he proceeds to backtrack almost immediately by of-
fering the following qualification:
Or, if not forced to track all of the interests and ideas of the person involved–
these may make inconsistent demands–at least forced to track the relevant ones . 
(Pettit 1997: 55, my italics)
The “relevant” ones are then described as those “shared in common with 
others, not those that treat me as exceptional” in virtue of their “sectional and 
factional character” (Pettit 1997: 56) . To see why this fails to solve the prob-
lem, consider Mill’s discussion of the “religious bigot”, who “when charged 
with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort 
that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or 
creed” (XVIII: 283) . Suppose that the bigot believes that, on the one hand, 
he and his community are sufficiently capable of shielding themselves from 
persecution without the protection of the state, but on the other, without the 
protection of the state his would-be targets would be unable to defend them-
selves against his own persecutional activities (cf . XXVI: 259) . If he then op-
poses such protective laws, both in their application to his own community as 
well as that of others, in what sense is he making an exception of himself?
One possible answer is that in rejecting the shield offered to him by the 
government, the bigot is not rejecting a shield as such, and is therefore seek-
ing an outcome in which the withdrawal of a shared shield leaves him excep-
tionally shielded . however, there is no contradiction in supposing that he 
might also be willing to abandon his own means of defence while maintain-
ing his means of offence, and granting such offensive means to his potential 
targets . After all, he may take his targets to be sufficiently pacific that they 
are unlikely to exploit his unshielded status, and hence be willing to depend 
upon the goodness of their will in order to render them dependent on the 
goodness of his own . 30 If this much is granted, there will be no shared de 
dicto interest in a mutually protective law, and Pettit will face a dilemma 
between either (a) accepting the quasi-anarchist implication that laws that 
interfere with the aggression of such a bigot are illegitimate qua arbitrary, or 
(b) conceding that this case provides a counter-example to his account of the 
conditions in which interference is a sign that someone’s person-freedom is 
compromised .
29 Combined with the fact that Pettit doesn’t want his republicanism to generate argu-
ments for anarchism or minarchism (see Pettit 2006: 138–146; 2014: 117) . 
30 Alternatively, he might not even mind exposure to attack . For example, a would-be 
suicide-bomber could view a condition in which he could only blow others up at will provided 
that they could do the same to him, as a condition which multiplies the opportunities for 
‘martyrdom’ . 
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Given that neither option is likely to be acceptable to him, this may also 
help to explain why Pettit adopts a much weaker requirement for non-domi-
nation in his more recent work:
[I]f you and your fellow citizens share equally in controlling the interference of 
the state in your lives […] then you will not be dominated by the state . (Pettit 
2014: 112–113, my italics)
This entails that equal control will render coercive interference non-arbitrary 
even if it produces policies contradicting the de dicto interests of particular 
citizens, including those that do not view themselves as having shared inter-
ests with others . The problem, however, is that even if it is implausible that 
laws must be forced to track each citizen’s de dicto interests in order to be non-
arbitrary, it is plausible that they would have to do so in order to avoid com-
promising their choice-freedom . In consequence, in weakening his account 
of what makes interference arbitrary, Pettit also undermines the claim that 
dissidents’ choice-freedom cannot be compromised by non-arbitrary law .
Of course, perhaps many, or even most, people are sufficiently agree-
able or egalitarian in spirit to consent to laws that they deem to have been 
produced by a suitably egalitarian decision-making procedure . Perhaps this 
consent is even sufficient for them not to be coerced by the implicit threats 
posed to them by these laws thereafter (provided that they can change their 
minds) (Mill, XXI: 336; Pettit 2008: 116–117) . however, even if this much 
is accepted, Pettit’s account still fails to explain why those who are less agree-
able do not have their choice-freedom compromised by the fact that they are 
compelled to obey these laws against their will . In consequence, his refusal 
to decouple person-freedom from choice-freedom leaves his account facing 
the reductio ad absurdum that characters manifesting a will to domination are 
themselves dominated by laws that (Mill can maintain) merely prevent them 
from dominating others .
In the following passage of On Liberty we can see the deeper significance 
of Mill’s decoupling of the idea of a law that is non-arbitrary from that of a 
law that does not compromise choice-freedom:
There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may right-
fully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to 
bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary 
to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform 
certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or 
interposing to protect the defenceless against ill usage, things which whenever it 
is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society 
for not doing . (Mill, XVIII: 224–225)
here Mill claims that it is possible to justify compelling people to con-
tribute to the maintenance of institutions that are necessary for the mutual 
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protections that constitute egalitarian agency-freedom . This commits him 
to denying that such compulsion is arbitrary even if some of those who are 
thus compelled either (i) oppose egalitarian agency-freedom (as in the case 
of Nietzsche), or (ii) would be happy to abandon the shielded-status associ-
ated with agency-freedom (as in the adapted case of the religious bigot) . Pos-
sibility (ii) highlights the fact that even Mill believes that there is a sense in 
which it is possible for people to be ‘forced to be free’, namely, one in which 
people’s choice-freedom is compromised when they are compelled to perform 
acts that serve to secure the agency-freedoms required for their person-free-
dom .31 Moreover, both possibilities illustrate the reason why it is reasonable 
for liberals to reject DN, namely, that choice-freedom can be compromised 
by coercive interference that is non-arbitrary qua required to sustain egalitar-
ian agency-freedom .
Conclusion
This paper has proceeded from the assumption that Mill agrees with Pettit 
that domination is sufficient to compromise social person-freedom, without 
taking this to imply either that Mill accepts Pettit’s equation of non-domina-
tion and social person-freedom, or that he isn’t also concerned to promote 
forms of psychological freedom for which he takes non-domination to be in-
sufficient . From that foundation, it argued that Mill is correct to reject Pettit’s 
claim that domination is a necessary condition of compromised choice-free-
dom (DN), as non-domineering coercive interference–not least that which is 
necessary to uphold a free society–can compromise choice-freedom without 
compromising person-freedom (CCP) . In consequence, he denies that free 
societies can offer a ‘perfect’ republican liberty (cf . Mill, XXVI: 321 quoted 
in Section 1), in which people’s choice-freedom is never compromised, and 
maintains that free societies are to be valued as much for the choice-freedoms 
that they compromise as for those they protect .32
31 This adapts a point made by lyons (1994: 90–96; cf . Urbinati 2002: 168) . Note that 
the possibility of α compelling β to perform acts that are necessary for β’s person-freedom 
is consistent with the harm Principle, as it does not entail that β’s person-freedom justifies 
the compulsion . Nevertheless, if refusing legal recognition to voluntary slave contracts entails 
compelling people to preserve their person-freedom, Mill seems to allow for an exception 
to his prohibition on paternalistic justification in such cases (XVIII: 300; cf . lovett 2008: 
123–132) .
32 Acknowledgements: Material from this paper was first presented at a conference on 
Philip Pettit’s Republicanism at Sun Yat-sen University (Zhuhai) in March 2018 . I would 
like to thank Jun-hyeok Kwak for inviting me to participate in that event, hAN Rui for 
comments, and Philip Pettit for his kind encouragement to develop the presentation into a 
paper . I also had the opportunity to present some of the material at the lingnan University 
Philosophy Seminar in November 2018, for which I would like to thank Derek Baker and the 
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